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THE PROBLEM OF WIRETAPPING AND PROPOSED
LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
I
By LESLIE B. JOSEPH
A most delicate problem is now confronting the Congress: Should Con-
gress authorize wire-tapping by federal officers, and should the evidence
so obtained be admissible in the federal courts? It is felt that it is not only
desirable, but imperative that criminals threatening the national security
be detected and prosecuted with the utmost diligence. Yet, it is no less
imperative that constitutional rights of privacy be protected from unwar-
ranted invasions. Somewhere between these two conflicting objectives lies
a balance that the Congress must strike.
Historical Background.
Perhaps the first important recognition was given to the wire-tap prob-
lem near the termination of World War I, when the Congress placed an
absolute ban on wire-tapping.' But this was shortlived; wire-tapping was
again revived shortly after hostilities ceased and continued until 1924,
when Attorney-General Stone and later Attorney-General Sargent prohib-
ited its use. January, 1931, Attorney-General Mitchell reopened the use of
this method to agents of the Justice Department, but only upon dirction
of the chief of the bureau involved. This policy was bolstered in 1933 by
Attorney-General Cummings, who defended it as necessary in the public
interest.
During this period, in 1928, the case of Olmstead v. United States2 was
decided. The court, in a 5 to 4 decision, held that neither the fourth or fifth
amendments were violated by the use of wire-tap evidence; that is, its use
was neither compelling a defendant to incriminate himself nor was the tap-
ing itself an illegal search and seizure. The court, conceding the evidence
had not been obtained in conformity with the "highest ethics," stated that
any ban on evidence obtained by such means must emanate from the Con-
gress. Justice Holmes, in a powerful dissent, claimed wire-tapping to be
a "dirty business" and in so doing reflected what was to be the future atti-
tude of the court.
The catalyst for this future attitude came from Congress in section 605
of the Communications Act of 1934,1 which in essence stated: "no person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance... of such intercepted
communication to any person."
In the case of Nardone v. United States,4 the court held that the ban of
section 605 applied to federal agents, and that evidence obtained by them
140 STAT. 1017 (1918). Also see 52 CoL. L. REV. 165 (1952).
2 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
3 48 STAT. 1103, 47 U.S.C. 605 (1934).
S302 U.S. 379 (1937).
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through the tap was inadmissible in federal courts. This was contrary to
the belief of many that section 605 was intended only to establish the regu-
latory powers of the Federal Communications Commission.5 Nevertheless,
the court's deep concern over the moral issues involved seemingly influ-
enced their decision, the majority opinion stating in part:
"For years controversy has raged with respect to the morality of the
practice of wire-tapping by officers to obtain evidence. It has been the view
of many that the practice involves a grave wrong Congress may have
thought it less important that some offenders should be unwhipped of jus-
tice than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with
ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty "0
This decision was soon to be extended even further by the second
Nardone case.' The court now decided that section 605 was not only a bar
to evidence obtained directly from the wire-tap, but to any evidence gained
through its use, no matter how indirect; section 605 barred the "fruit of
the poisonous tree."
Since the decisions in the two Nardone cases, it has been conceded that
section 605 remains a bar to the introduction of evidence obtained through
use of the tap. The bulk of subsequent cases have dealt only with the tech-
icalities of the section, t.e., the question whether section 605 is a bar to
state action; 8 what interpretations are to be given to the terms "intercept" 9
and "authorization",'I and upon whom are placed the burdens of per-
suasion and of producing evidence."
Merits-Pro and Con.
These cases have spawned many arguments both for and against the
desirability of wire-tapping by authorized federal agents and admissibility
of evidence so gained in federal courts. Dominating the arguments are four
main issues:
1. Whether use of the wire-tap is "dirty business"?'
5 Goldman v U.S., 316 U.S. 129 (1942), Weiss v. U.S., 308 U.S. 321 (1939), SEN. REP.
No. 781, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934)
6 302 U.S. at 383, 384.
7 Nardone v. U.S., 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
8 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
9In U.S. v Yee Ping Jong, 26 F.Supp. 69 (W.D. Pa. 1939), the court held that where
the phone was tapped by federal agents at the informer's end there was no interception within
the meaning of the section. The import of the decision was that interception was held to mean
a seizure before arrival at a destined place, and here there was a mere recording at one end of
the line as it was received by a consenting informer. A later case, U.S. v. Polakoff, 112 F2d 888
(2d Cir. 1940), cert. derned, 311 U.S. 653 (1940), decided on similar facts that section 605 was
violated, stating that the word "sender", as used in the section applied to both parties and that
therefore both must consent. Yet, in U.S. v. Sullivan, 116 F Supp. 480 (D.D.C. 1953), the
court reverted to its former holding in U.S. v Yee Ping Jong, which would appear to be the
present view.
10 U.S. v. Yee Ping Jong, supra note 8.
1 1 Nardone v U.S., 308 338 (1939), U.S. v Coplon, 91 F.Supp. 867 (D.C.D.C. 1950),
U.S. v. Pillon, 36 F.Supp. 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
12 See note 2 supra.
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2. Whether wire-tapping is an unreasonable invasion of privacy?'"
3. Whether there is an undue probability that wire-tapping may be
used to harm innocent persons?
4. Whether the authority, in whomsoever vested, will be abused?
Since Justice Holmes' dissent in the Otmstead case, it has been argued
with much vigor that wire-tapping is "dirty business"-that it would be
a far greater evil that the government should play an ignoble part than that
some criminals should be permitted freedom. Yet, to the protagonists of
wire-tapping, this argument has seemed inconsistent with the present state
of the law. In point are the many cases admitting evidence obtained by
eavesdropping or by recording devices attached to an adjoining wall. - Are
these methods of obtaining evidence any the less "dirty business" than the
wire-tap? And again, is it any the less noble to use the telephone as a means
of hampering a criminal who has himself taken advantage of the instrument
to further his own mischievous ends? On the contrary, it would seem to be
but a common sense solution to an exigency.
Undoubtedly, even a carefully restricted legalization of wire-tapping
would be an invasion of privacy But those pressing Congress to maintain
the status quo appear to have overlooked the prevailing state of the law.
To tap another's telephone and listen to the conversation is not a vwolation
of section 605, which reads: "intercept . and divulge." This is the pres-
ent state of the law--only where both interception and divulgence are pres-
ent is the law violated.'- At least one proposed bill in Congress makes inter-
ception alone, except where authorized, criminally punishable.16 Thus,
relatively, such an enactment would be far less onerous than the existing
condition. The "status quo view" would seem to be naive, since even present
law is inadequate to assure complete freedom from invasions of privacy
Another criticism of legalized wire-tapping is the possibility that the
device might be used to harm innocent persons. There is the ever present
possibility that certain portions of a wire-tap recording could be deleted,
and result in a seemingly criminal conversation. However, the procedural
and evidential safeguards here seem to be adequate. A grand jury would
first weigh any evidence before indicting an alleged wrongdoer. Then the
judge would next determine the relevancy and reliability of the evidence,
similar to evidence gathered in any other manner, before allowing it to come
before a petit jury The general rule is that all the relevant evidence of a
particular transaction should be admitted or none at all.'7 Since the matter
33 U.S. v. Polakoff, supra note 8; GREENMxA, WIRE TAPINGO, ITS RELATION TO CIVI LIB-
RniEs (1938).
14 Goldman v. U.S., 316 US. 129 (1942), Schoborg v. U.S., 264 Fed. 1 (C.C.A. 6th 1920),
dictograph; People v. Schultz, 18 Cal.App.2d 485, 64 P.2d 440 (1937), dictaphone; People
v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166 (1874), police officer listened to conversation m defendant's cell; Kidd
v. People, 97 Colo. 480, 51 P.2d 1020 (1935), dictograph, State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 134
S.E. 885 (1926), police used detectaphone to eavesdrop on conversation in defendant's cell.
15 Supra note 4.
16 S. 3229, as proposed with amendments by the late Senator McCarran of Nevada.
17 CAIF. CODE OF CIVI PROCEDURE, § 1854.
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of relevancy is subject to the court's discretion, this in the ordinary instance
should be an adequate shield to the innocent.
Perhaps the most valid criticism of legalized wire-tapping is the possi-
bility that the authority, in whomsoever vested, would be abused. But is
this not true of any delegation of authority regardless of the purpose? That
the Congress, who will have created the authority, has the inherent power
to destroy it promptly in cases of abuse would seem to be an adequate
safeguard.
Objectzves of Pending Legislation.
Before commencing with an evaluation of the various proposed wire-
tap bills and of a suggested bill, it would seem proper to examine the con-
gressional motives. What evils does the Congress hope to alleviate, and
what affirmative objectives are they desirous of achieving?", Namely,
1. To permit the government in cases involving national security to offer
into evidence materials gained through wire-tapping by federal officers.
2. To criminally penalize all other unauthorized wire-tapping.
3. To place the authority to wire-tap in an agency that will use it with
the greatest efficiency and yet not abuse it.
4. To make evidence already gathered through the wire-tap method
presently admissible.
Let us now examine, in substance, the texts of the bills pending in Con-
gress before passing on their virtues or lack of them.
H.R. 8649 (Passed H.R. on April 8, 1954)
"Be it enacted That information obtained prior to the effective date
of this act through or as a result of the interception of any communica-
tion by wire or radio upon the express written approval of the Attorney
General of the United States and in the course of any investigation to
detect or prevent any interference with or endangering of the national
security or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage, espionage,
sedition, seditious conspiracy, be deemed admissible, if not otherwise
inadmissible, in evidence in any criminal proceedings in any court estab-
lished by Act of Congress, but only in criminal cases involving any of the
foregoing violations.
"SEc. 2. That information obtained after the effective date of this Act
, through or as a result of the interception of any communication by
wire or radio upon the express written approval of the Attorney General
of the United States shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1103), be deemed ad-
missible: Provided, That prior to intercepting the communications
from which the information is obtained, an authorized agent of any one of
said investigatorial agencies shall have been issued an ex parte order by a
judge of any United States Court of Appeals or a United States district
court, authorizing the agent to intercept such communications. Upon appli-
Is See Senate bulletin, WIRETAPPING FOR NATioNAL SEcURITy. Heanngs before a subcom-
mittee of the Committee on the Judiciary; U.S. SENATE; 83rd CONGsREss; 2nd SEssIoN.
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cation. . a judge... may issue an ex parte order, . if the judge is satis-
fied that there is reasonable cause to believe that such crime or crimes have
been or are about to be committed and that the communications may con-
tam information which would assist in the conduct of such investigations."
S. 3229:19
"Be it enacted . That Chapter 13 of title 18 of the United States Code,
entitled "Civil Rights", is amended by-.. Inserting.., the following new
section: . . Whoever, without authorization from the sender and the re-
cipient of any wire communication by common carrier, willfully intercepts,
or attempts to intercept . such wire communication, except in compliance
with State law or, in any case of an interception by a Federal officer or
employee, in compliance with the second paragraph of thns section, shall
be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
"Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe on the basis of a
request by the head of any Federal investigative agency for action pursuant
to this section that evidence of the commission of any crime punishable
under chapter 37, chapter 105, or chapter 115 of this title, or under section 4
or section 15 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, may be ob-
tained, or that the commission of any such crime may be prevented, through
the interception of any wire communication, he may so certify, in writing
and designate in such certificate any United States Attorney, Assistant
United States Attorney, or officer or attorney of the Department of Justice
authorized by him to make application for an order allowing such intercep-
tion pursuant to this paragraph. Any officer or attorney so authorized may
file with any judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Judicial Circuit an application for an ex parte order allowing
such interception. Such application shall be supported by... reasonable
ground for belief that such interception will result in the procurement of
evidence of, or the prevention of, the commission of any such crime. If
the judge determines that such ground has been shown, he shall issue an
order allowing such interception. Each such order shall specify the circuit
or circuits upon which communications may be intercepted .. No such
order shall be effective for a period longer than 6 months unless renewed
. .after a new determination by the judge in the case of each renewal that
reasonable ground for continued interception has been shown ..
SEc. 2. The proviso contained in section 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934. . is amended to read as follows: "Provided, that this section
shall not apply. nor be deemed to prohibit the use by Federal law en-
forcement officials, in connection with the prosecution or prevention of any
crime affecting the internal security of the United States, of any informa-
tion obtained as a result of any interception, not in violation of section 245
of title 18 of the United States Codes, of any wire or radio communication."
S. 2753.2
"Be it enacted... That section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934
is hereby amended by changing the period at the end thereof to a colon
19 Pending before the Senate.
20 Pending before the Senate.
Nov., 19541
and by adding thereafter the following words: 'Provided further, that this
section shall not apply to any future or past reception or interception of
any communication nor to any future or past divulging, publishing, or use
of the existence, content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of any com-
mumcation (a) if such reception, interception, divulging, publishing, and
use, whether occurring heretofore or hereafter, was or is for the purpose of
aiding a prosecution in the Federal courts of the United States for treason,
espionage, or any other crime involving the national security, or (b) if such
communication, whether occurring heretofore or hereafter, is relevant or
material to the prosecution in such courts of any person charged with any
such crime'"
S. 832:1
"Be it enacted That (a) the Director of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation of the Department of Justice; the Director of the Military In-
telligence Division of the Department of the Army; the Director of Intelli-
gence, United States Air Force; and the chief of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence of the Navy Department are authorized under rules and regulations
as prescribed by the Attorney General, in the conduct of investigations, to
ascertain, prevent, or frustrate any interference or any attempts or plans
for interference with the national security and defense, to require that
telegrams, cablegrams, radiograms, or other wire or radio communications
and copies or records thereof, or, upon the express written approval of the
Attorney General, that any information obtained by means of intercepting
communications, be disclosed and delivered to any authorized agent I
without regard to the limitations contained in section 605 of the Commum-
cations Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1103). The information thus obtained shall
be admissible in evidence Provided, That prior to acquiring or inter-
cepting the communications from which the information is obtained, an
authorized agent shall have been issued a permit by a judge of any
United States court, authorizing the agent to acquire or intercept such
communications.
(b) Upon application by any authorized agent a judge of any United
States court shall issue a permit , if the judge is satisfied that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the communications may contain informa-
tion which would assist in the conduct of such investigations."
Just where do these bills fall short of the objectives previously ennu-
merated and are these objectives proper? A critical examination of the
objectives in relation to the legislation can go far toward answering this
query
1. The primary objective is to allow the government to offer evidence
gathered through the process of wire-tapping in cases affecting the national
security I The inability of the government to do so presently and in the
past has allowed many acknowledged criminals to escape justice. Yet this
objective has been restricted to those crimes only which threaten the secur-
21 Pending before the Senate.
2 See note 17 supra.
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ity of the nation. Some have expressed the wish to extend the weapon to
kidnapping and extortion cases as well.2 Perhaps restricting the privilege
to cases involving national security is wise, since it will enable the Congress
to appraise the merits of wire-tapping before extending it further to such
crimes as kidnapping and extortion. This view will undoubtedly aid the
legislation in passing successfully through both houses of the Congress.
As can be observed from reading the foregoing bills, all fulfill the first
objective except for slight deviations concerning the limits of what is na-
tional security.
2. A failing of the present federal law is that no criminal penalties exist
as to private individuals who have made use of the wire-tap to suit personal
or business ends. That criminal penalties should attach to such conduct has
not been denied by any faction in the controversy Yet only one bill, S. 3229,
criminally penalized this practice, the remainder failing to even touch upon
such conduct.
3. One of the most difficult objectives is to place the authority in some
agency which will not abuse it, and still maintain a speed of action not
inconsistent with the utmost secrecy of operation.
One faction" proposes that permission to wire-tap should be granted
only to duly authorized agencies upon application to a judge of any United
States Court of Appeals or District Court. Here if the judge is satisfied
that reasonable cause exists that a crime against the national security has
been or may be committed he may issue an ex parte order authorizing the
tap. Although the chances of abuse are nominal by this procedure, it has
been suggested that the machinery fails to fulfill the requirements of speed
and secrecy so necessary in such undertakings, and that no uniform cri-
terion exists concerning the facts sufficient to authorize the tap. For exam-
ple, if federal agents learn facts which indicate that immediate authority
to tap is needed, it might take some time to get the ex parte order, for such
reasons as vacations, illness, etc. The delay might well prove disastrous to
the operation. When contacted, the application would pass through many
hands, such as clerks and stenographers who have no security clearances,
thus endangering the secrecy Because there are over two hundred federal
judges eligible to sign such orders, an enormous variance in opinions as to
what "reasonable cause" is would prevail.
The alternative solution is that the authority should be vested alone in
the office of the Attorney-General.' Although an abuse of authority through
over-zealousness is more likely through this method, this danger would
seem to be more than compensated for by the speed, secrecy, and uniform-
ity gained. And what agency is better equipped to decide whether a threat
to the national security is in the offing than the chief law enforcement body
in government?
23 Ibid.
24 Senators Wiley, Keating, and McCarran, who have drafted three of the bills discussed
herein.
25 39 CoNrELL L. Q. 195, 211 (1954).
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Three of the bills proposed take the view that a court order should
first issue before wire-tapping may be authorized. The fourth, S. 2753, is
completely silent upon the issue. On the arguments just mentioned it would
seem that the lack of efficiency of this procedure would impair the func-
tioning of the investigative agencies involved, and that perhaps those ad-
vocating the court order procedure should reconsider their stand in the
light of the practical necessities involved.
4. The question whether the new legislation should validate the admis-
sibility of wire-tap evidence already obtained as well as that gathered after
passage of positive legislation has plagued the Congress. The primary prob-
lem appears to be whether such legislation would be unconstitutional as an
ex post facto law Since only a rule of evidence would be altered, and not
the ablity to convict upon less proof in amount and degree than was re-
quired when the crime was committed, such a law would in all likelihood be
held constitutional.28
A Suggested Bill and Conclusion.
An attempt is here made to draft a bill which, in substance, fulfills the
objectives hereinbefore mentioned:
"Be it enacted That Chapter 13 of Title 18 of the United States
Code entitled "Civil Rights", is amended by-
(a) Inserting, at the end of the sectional analysis preceding section 241
thereof, the following new section caption: "245. Interception and
divulgence of wire-communications."
(b) Inserting immediately after section 244 thereof, the following new
section: "§245. Interception and divulgence of wire-conmunications.
"Whoever, without authorization from the sender and the recipient of
any wire communication by common carrier, willfully intercepts or di-
vulges, or attempts to intercept or divulge, or procures any other person to
intercept or divulge or attempt to intercept or divulge such wire com-
munication, except in compliance with the second paragraph of this section,
shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than ten years
or both.
Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe on the basis of
a request by the head of any Federal investigative agency for action pur-
suant to this section that evidence of the commission of any crime involving
the national security of the United States may be obtained, or that the com-
mission of any such crime may be prevented, through the interception of
any wire communication, he is thereby authorized to so act, such authority
to intercept remaining valid where reasonable ground for continued inter-
ception exists.
Evidence obtained in this manner, both prior and subsequent to this
Act, shall be deemed admissible, if not otherwise inadmissible, for the pur-
pose of aiding any prosecution in the Federal courts of the United States
26 U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1945), also see Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380
(1898), where the statute making admissible evidence that was not admissible when the crime
was committed was held not to be an ex post facto law.
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for any crime involving the national security, notwithstanding the pro-
visions of section 605 of the Commumcations Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1103)."
The shortcomings of each of the bills pending in the Congress, and of
the present law, are apparent to this writer. Perfection cannot be attained
because it does not exist. Yet the wisdom of the Congress can overcome
many existing deficiencies and perhaps mold the virtues of each bill into
one workable tool with which to enhance the efficiency of the federal courts
without a sacrifice of justice.
